Buy-Side M&A Masterclass Part 2 | How to Value a Business and Make a Smart Offer
Jimmy was second-guessing himself as he sat alone at a table at Chesterfield, a table he had dined at dozens of times before. He was there to meet Mark, a potential buyer for his business. Now, although he had gotten a lot of interest over the years from potential buyers, this was the first time he was actually gonna meet one in person, and even he was surprised. As Jimmy sat there, head full of numbers, trying to think about how he was gonna pitch this business, he looked up to see a man far more casually dressed than he was approaching the table. “Jimmy, it’s such a pleasure to meet you. Thank you for having me up. Now, what do you say? Should we start with the greens?” “Absolutely, let’s do it. But Mark, I’m kind of surprised you even know what Utica Greens are.” “Well, Jimmy, I’ve heard for years how famous Utica Greens are, and I’m dying to actually try ’em.”
“Well, Mark, my first time was over 50 years ago, and I might be the only person here in Utica that hasn’t gotten tired of them.” “Jimmy, it sounds like you’ve been here your whole life. Tell me what that was like, growing up here.” “Yeah, I was born and raised here, actually, and you know, this restaurant is famous for having invented the Greens, but I don’t know. I first experienced them in my mom’s kitchen. My father worked for the railroad and really wasn’t able to take us here, thinking back.”
“He’d probably be tickled knowing that I can come here anytime I want.” “Your father sounds like a real hardworking man, Jimmy, just like my old man. But I’m not gonna lie to you. If we went out to eat when I was a kid, it was because somebody else was paying.” Over the course of the next two hours, Mark and Jimmy ate, talked, and laughed. Time really seemed to fly by, and all those numbers Jimmy memorized prior to the lunch proved unnecessary.
Sure, they talked about business, but they spent a lot more time talking about background and family, goals, desires, what Jimmy might do if he does sell his business. As Jimmy walked Mark out to his car, he wondered, had he dropped the ball? I mean, he had all these numbers in his head, right? He was reading his P&L and EBITDA and cash flow and the growth rates, and God knows what he was thinking about, and I think he expected Mark to interrogate him a little bit about the financials.
Either way, he had a wonderful time with Mark and was left with a great feeling about it. Hi, I’m Paul Giannamore. I’m an investment banker, and I negotiate for a living. In today’s dialogue between Mark and Jimmy, you’d be forgiven for thinking that meeting was a total waste of time. I mean, look, Mark gets in the car, drives all the way from Philadelphia to Utica, eats some greens.
Talks about hobbies, doesn’t really ask many questions about the business. Doesn’t present an offer, doesn’t talk about deal structure. I mean, he literally talks to Jimmy about what he wants to do with his life, where he comes from, what’s his family like, what’s his goals and aspirations, gets in the car, and drives away. But in reality, that was the fourth or fifth step in a highly choreographed, very sophisticated process run by Mark that ultimately resulted in an offer being tendered to Jimmy the very next day.
And this transaction closed some months down the road, creating a tremendous amount of value for Mark, but left Jimmy feeling like he got everything he wanted. And that’s what we’re gonna focus on in today’s continuation, the buy-side M&A Masterclass series. We’re gonna go from the initial approach, like when Mark approached Jimmy, to valuing the business, to ultimately structuring the offer.
In the first installment of the buy-side M&A Masterclass series, we talked about simply whether or not making an acquisition is right for you. And today we’re gonna get you into the game, and I’m gonna focus on the front end of the acquisition process, the sourcing and meeting of the potential seller, the valuation of the business, and ultimately the crafting of the offer. And traditionally, in buy-side M&A, there’s a tremendous amount of focus on technical skills, right?
Valuation, financial accounting, due diligence. And there’s not so much focus on psychology, negotiation, as well as building rapport with the seller. And so, as you know, I’m a sell-side advisor. I mean, I spent a couple of years on the buy side, but the extreme majority of my time has always been spent on the sell side. And that provides me some unique insight into the mind of the seller.
So for example, I do hundreds of meetings per year with sellers and buyers sitting down together and talking. I get to see how the seller performs. I get to watch how the buyer performs, but then I get to see the magic happen after the buyer leaves, and I get to talk to the seller, and I get to understand, well, that guy was a pompous asshole. This guy was super nice, so on and so forth. And I’ve been able to really understand what makes sellers tick, how buyers can put themselves in a great position, but also how buyers can completely shit the bed.
And when I think about buy-side M&A, I think it’s important to take a lot of the skill sets that one can learn on the sell side and apply to buy side. So for example, you know, look, you could have the best lead generation engine, right? You can get very technical about sending out emails and letters and phone calls and so on and so forth, and bring in a bunch of potential buy-side leads. But if you can’t build a rapport with a seller, they become worthless from a valuation perspective.
You could be great with numbers, right? CFA certificate on the wall, desk full of monitors, spreadsheets, all sorts of stuff. And you could precisely value a business. But if you can’t keep that seller from having eyes for other buyers, if you can’t corral them into your process, you’re gonna end up overpaying for the deal, if you do it at all. So understanding how to do that is equally as important, and I would often argue more important than the ability to value the business.
So these are the concepts that I wanna focus on today. So let’s go back to the conversation between Mark and Jimmy. So Mark is actually a very sophisticated business owner. He’s got a degree from Stanford. He’s got a degree from Wharton. He knows technology, he knows software.
He’s bought and sold many businesses, and right now he owns a software business that focuses on the hospitality space. And he had grown that for some years. And then he decided now was the time for him to do an acquisition. And being skilled in acquisitions, he knew how to deal with sellers. He began his process with Jimmy months before he ever reached out to Jimmy. As the owner of a software business focused on hospitality, he really began to understand the various different players in the space and what their capabilities were. And he knew that it’s a relatively narrow field. He’s not in a business where there’s a hundred or 200 potential acquisition targets. He’s in a business where there’s maybe five or six. So he did his research upfront. He understood which various different businesses exist, what sort of capabilities they could provide him.
But he made an important decision from the front end. He said to himself, if I do an acquisition, the acquisition has to work from a financial perspective on a standalone basis. I am not going to pay for synergies, right? And I’m not gonna do a deal if I don’t get synergies. I don’t want to just buy another software company. I want to buy a software company that I could somehow utilize.
And when he looked at the field, what he determined was, not a lot of these companies provided him any sort of software code or technology that he could really utilize, but there were a few of ’em that had some really marquee accounts and would allow him to cross-sell his services into the hotels in which those companies are already operating. And so over the last few years, he kept stumbling upon Jimmy’s business.
So Jimmy’s business focuses on point of sale and inventory control in hotel restaurants, right? It just focuses on the hotel restaurants, as opposed to operating the front or back office as a hotel. Whereas Mark’s business focused more on front office operations. Mark looked at Jimmy’s business and thought to himself, look, I can add on an additional suite of services, right?
So now I can deal with the restaurants, but more importantly, Jimmy’s got a lot. He’s been around 30 years, I haven’t. He’s got a lot of great customer relationships and some really great hotel chains. He also has a small team of direct sales folks that have very deep relationships with hotels across the country. And these are folks that have worked for Jimmy for years and years and years, and Mark was doing a lot of online sales.
He didn’t have folks to go out, go into a hotel in Manhattan. Jimmy had account reps that would go out into these hotels, that had longstanding deep relationships with management at a variety of hotels. So Mark began to think, hmm, I can buy this business. His software is not — Jimmy’s software, by the way, is not outstanding, but it’s operative.
And maybe over time I could take my skills and change the software offer, right? So that was one opportunity, but that wasn’t a near-term thing. It was a longer-term value creation, potentially. But immediately he could take Jimmy’s software and add it to his suite of software. So to him, that made a lot of sense. But most importantly, getting the sales force with the deep relationships, which would allow Mark to really accelerate growth on his side.
So he put Jimmy in tier one. So this was a tier one target for him. He was gonna focus a lot of effort on Jimmy. There were some other smaller software providers that did different things within hotels that he thought, okay, these are great tier two acquisition targets, and there were three of ’em. And then he found a few others, which were like, hey, if I could really get these at a great price, like pay next to nothing for them, they’re worth it.
So those were tier three. So what Mark did some months ago is, he sat down and he wrote a very personalized letter to each of the owners, right? He could have sent an email, it could have ended up in spam, or it would’ve been one of the 500 other emails guys like Jimmy get from search funds and private equity firms and other strategic acquirers, which again would likely have been ignored.
So Mark wrote the letter, and he’d done research. So he understood the history of Jimmy’s business, how Jimmy founded it. He knew who Jimmy’s key people were. He knew what awards and prizes the company had won. He also knew what hotels Jimmy operated out of. So in the letter he was able to say, Jimmy, I know you operate from X, Y, Z hotel.
I love that restaurant. I know you operate from this hotel and that hotel. He’s able to reference the accolades that Jimmy’s business had earned over the years and demonstrate sincere interest. So when Jimmy received this letter, it was really hard for him to — he couldn’t look at it and say, well, this is a form letter, right? Like this is a 20-year-old kid pumping these things out. He looked at it and said, okay, this is a guy who knows me.
This is a guy who knows my business. So it was worth returning the call. So Jimmy showed up at the office one day and there’s a FedEx pack on his desk. He opened it up, he read the letter, and he’s like, man, this is different from all the emails I get from Cedar Fork Capital. Let’s say, “Jimmy, we love your business and we really want to get in this industry, and you got 15 minutes to chat?” Or from a buy-side business broker.
So Jimmy picked up the phone and he called Mark back and he said, “Mark, I got your letter. You did some impressive research. Are you really serious about doing the deal? Like, what really makes you interested in my company?” So they had a very brief chat. Mark told him a little bit about himself. “You know, I used to be in investment banking, then I went to private equity, but I’ve always been a software guy, so I’ve bought and sold some software companies.
I’m in the process of growing mine, and I think there’s some great synergies between our businesses, and I would love to chat with you about it.” And Mark was elated to get the call from Jimmy, but he was also prepared. He had already prepared a non-disclosure agreement that protected the information that Jimmy would subsequently provide to him, but it even protected Jimmy from the fact that he was even having a conversation with the buyer. And the non-disclosure agreement,
it said, hey, the fact that we’re having this conversation, period, and that you know me, is confidential. And Mark had that prepared, and he said, “Jimmy, I really want to have a serious discussion with you, and I put together a mutual non-disclosure agreement. I want you to know that I’m serious, so I’m gonna send it to you.” So he got Jimmy’s email and sent him the non-disclosure agreement. Then he set up another call. And they had a series of calls over the following few weeks, and Jimmy felt comfortable. There was a non-disclosure agreement.
He liked talking to Mark. He thought Mark had a good personality. He thought Mark was smart. And Mark started to ask for financials, and Mark said to Jimmy, “Jimmy, you know, I realize you’re busy running your business, and I would really like to dig into the details of your business to make a relatively quick decision. Alright, you’re a busy guy.
I don’t wanna distract you. I’ve got a lot of stuff to do. I want to kind of see if there’s something there. And so I’m wondering if you would be willing to provide me any financial information. I don’t wanna see anything about your accounts. I don’t wanna see anything right now that you would be uncomfortable giving me, but if you have some financial statements that I could take a look at, because I can start to think about the economics of this deal.”
So what Mark did is, he took control of this. He didn’t ask Jimmy what Jimmy wants from a purchase price perspective. He also didn’t provide Jimmy a massive request list. He had a telephone call, and he said, “Jimmy, if I could see three years of financial statements — I don’t need tax returns.
If you have ’em, that’s great. If you have internal financial statements, I’m happy to take a look at those. Maybe you use QuickBooks. If you have something that shows me your accounts, but something that’s sanitized, right? I don’t need to see the name of your accounts, but I’d like to understand the customer concentration of your business. How many hotels do you serve? Like, I would imagine you serve the Marriott, so that’s a big chain.
Do you have one account there which accounts for 25% of your business, or are you selling directly into individual hotels?” He had a very, very casual and informal conversation. No request list went out. It was just, hey, a couple of different bullet points. “This’ll orient me and kind of give me a sense of how our businesses fit together, because I’m not really interested in doing a deal unless there’s a cultural fit, a financial fit between the businesses, and I think you would appreciate that for me as well, Jimmy.”
So Jimmy went and talked to his wife Cheryl over dinner, explained to her what happened, and she said, “Hey, that might be an in, you know. Mark seems like a good guy. Talk to the lawyer.” So he talked to his lawyer. The lawyer looked at the NDA and said, “Yeah, it looks — it looks appropriate for what you’re trying to do.” So Jimmy sent Mark financial information, and over the course of the next few weeks, Mark spent time.
He put together a very basic financial model. And so, when we start to think about valuation, Mark wasn’t concerned about comparable transaction statistics. You know, when you think about valuation, there’s a variety of ways you can do it, right? Like, from a broad-brush perspective, you have the comparable acquisition approach, right?
We call this the market approach. You have the income approach, which is internal rates of return, discounted cash flow analysis, and all this financial mumbo jumbo. Now, Mark was actually sophisticated enough to understand that Mark could build a DCF, Mark could go out and find industry comps. He wasn’t concerned with that. As Mark went into this acquisition process, he thought to himself,
I’m gonna determine what this business is worth on a standalone basis. I’m not gonna concern myself with highest investment value or what the business would look like being combined with mine. I’m gonna take a step back and forget about synergies and just say, if I were a financial buyer, and if I were gonna buy Jimmy’s business on a standalone basis, what would that business potentially be worth?
I like to do fair deals, but I’m the one writing the check, and I’m the one taking the risk. So my purchase price is gonna be inversely related to risk. So the higher the price that I pay, the more risk I’m gonna have, and naturally the lower return. So I’m gonna go into this with the mindset that as a buyer, I always need to be focused on decreasing my risk.
Now, one of the unfortunate byproducts of that for a seller means lower price, but Mark couldn’t concern himself with that. He needed to focus first on his risk profile. So instead of going out and talking to private equity firms and bankers and getting online and doing research as to what software companies trade for — wasn’t concerned about that — he was concerned about what that business would be worth to him.
So he looked at the financial statements, and the business was doing about $10 million a year, and it wasn’t growing particularly rapidly. In fact, it was barely growing at the rate of inflation. It was growing at single-digit top-line rates. And he realized, Jimmy’s in his sixties, the business is kicking off almost $2 million a year in cash flow. So we’ve got Jimmy, who lives up in Utica, New York, conservative, generating $2 million per year.
Jimmy wasn’t trying to break anything, right? Jimmy wasn’t gonna go out and blow this thing up. That wasn’t his goal. It was a lifestyle business for him that he literally founded 30-odd years ago when he was working the night shift at a hotel. So when Mark looked at the financials, he said, okay, a $10 million business growing at roughly 5% per year, $2 million in cash flow. If he focuses on software comparable acquisition statistics, this could have been a 10 times deal or a 15 times deal, or even a 20 times EBITDA deal.
But he, at this point in time, wasn’t sure what Jimmy’s expectations were. So he looked at that business and said, man, if I can buy this business for five times EBITDA, that’s a $10 million purchase price. That’s a slam dunk for me. That’s really where I would like to be. And then he looked at it and said, at what point does the price get too high for me?
So as he ran his numbers, he said, look, you know, I could potentially go up to 10 times on this deal, but it really starts to squeeze my return. And again, Mark’s not running discounted cash flow models here. He’s doing bro math, right? He’s got the napkin out. He’s saying, okay, $2 million in cash flow, I pay five times for it,
I’m gonna get a 20% return. Yeah, I don’t know that I really wanna go much, much above that. And could I potentially, on a standalone basis, get this up into the higher single digits? Sure. But 10 times or north of that, I don’t think it really makes sense for me, because quite frankly, I could take that cash and redeploy it into my business.
I can take that money and hire a sales force similar to Jimmy. I mean, maybe I can go out and overpay to poach some of Jimmy’s sales folks. So I don’t really need to do that. But I would like to get his software, because I think I can make some significant changes to that over time and really ramp that business up as well. Now Mark has the basis to craft an offer.
So he’s doing all this work in the background, right? He had a couple of conversations with Jimmy over the phone. He received some financial information, and in his last call he said, “Hey, Jimmy, I’d really like the opportunity to sit down with you in person so we can get to know each other.” So while they were coordinating schedules, Mark sat down and actually drafted an offer. Now, from an offer perspective, you can do this in a variety of different ways, and there’s a lot of different names to your offers, right?
There’s an indication of interest, which tends to be a one-pager, and an indication of interest is a very short, limited document that just literally expresses interest, right? Hey, I am interested in buying your business for between nine and $11 million. Oftentimes there’s a range in an indication of interest, ’cause you’re trying to gauge the other side.
And in formal sell-side processes, this is what we typically deal with on the front end of the process, right? If we go out to 12 strategic acquirers and 25 private equity firms, we’re usually not getting letters of intent. We’re getting indications of interest, because on the buy side, they’re trying to test where the market might be. And on the sell side, we’re also trying to test where the market is.
So where are these indications of more? But Mark took a different approach. I mean, he wasn’t in a competitive process. He had a direct one-on-one line to the seller. What he wanted to do is draft a term sheet of what we’ll call a letter of intent. In my mind, the term sheet and letter of intent are the exact same thing. And those tend to be documents that range from one to —
you know, 10 or 20 pages. I mean, they typically are a couple of pages, and they outline the rationale for doing the deal, and they talk about the terms. And I wanna step away from Jimmy and Mark for a second and focus on the letter of intent. And I want to say, when I’m talking about letters of intent, or LOIs, I’m talking to the US market, because when I talk about binding or non-binding, in certain jurisdictions a lot of letters of intent actually are binding.
But broadly, under US common law specifically, if you say this is a non-binding offer, it’s a non-binding offer. And again, I’m never giving legal advice. You under no circumstances should get involved in buying a business without competent M&A counsel. And I strongly suggest that you have competent counsel review even non-binding documents like LOIs, so that you never put something in there that you regret.
But a letter of intent — I mean, look, you can get online and pull up letters of intent. You can probably go to ChatGPT and pull up letters of intent. I’m not gonna focus on the technical aspects. What I’m gonna talk a little bit about today is what Mark did slightly different. So when Mark drafted his letter of intent, normally what you’ll see is, you know, typically a letter of intent would have an introductory paragraph and then say, this letter establishes the terms by which we intend to acquire X, Y, Z business, or substantially all the assets of this business, or the shares of this business, for such and such price.
And here’s all the terms. Now, Mark knew he was dealing with a seller who had never been through an acquisition process before, right? I mean, he talked to Jimmy about it on the phone, and Jimmy’s like, I’ve never really had any conversations with anyone about selling a business. So Mark said, you know what? I’m gonna take a very casual and informal approach to Jimmy, and I’m gonna write this thing in plain English.
There’s not gonna be a lot of legalese. I’m gonna draft a document where I am gonna outline how excited I am, why this business makes a lot of sense from a rationale perspective. I’m gonna talk about the purchase price and the structure. Jimmy, I’m really interested in acquiring all of the assets of your business, and I’ve come up with this purchase price, which I think is extremely fair to both you and I.
So instead of taking the very legal approach to this, he laid out the terms in the LOI and signed it, put it aside. Once he did that, he realized, I can just email this to Jimmy just to see how it goes, but I really need to build a rapport with Jimmy, and I wanna make sure that I can validate some of my thoughts and the offer that I’ve drafted, right?
So I’ve got this offer ready to go. I’d like to hand it to him, but I really need to get into Jimmy’s head. What does Jimmy actually want to do? I mean, does Jimmy want to sell his business? Does Jimmy want to sell his business but kind of stick around? Is Jimmy’s ego so tied to this business where it’s gonna be very, very difficult for him to leave it?
Right? I mean, this is a common issue that I deal with every single day. It’s like, sellers often identify with their business in a way that a father or mother would identify with a child, and to remove a seller from that business, there’s an actual grieving process, right? We don’t often think about grief, but I mean, we as humans face grief all the time.
You know, the manager that we really love leaves, we’re going to grieve that loss. We had a particular dream for our lives, and our life has taken a different turn. We have to grieve the loss of that dream. So you can’t underestimate the importance of the attachment between an actual founder and the business.
And Mark was cognizant of that. Like, he knew that — he was a founder himself. Like, he knew what it was like to put his blood, sweat, and tears into his business, build a relationship with his team and his customers, and then lose that. So he wanted to be able to sit down with Jimmy to really understand Jimmy’s connection with the business. But what motivates Jimmy?
Was Jimmy looking to buy the $20 million yacht, which probably was never gonna happen for Jimmy, but is that what he wanted to do? Or is Jimmy a family guy who’s got some children, he’s got a wife, maybe he wants to buy a vacation home, continue to live in Utica, has a nice savings already? What is Jimmy’s financial situation like? What were Jimmy’s aspirations? How did Jimmy think about investments?
You know, if you sit down and talk to a seller, they’ve got their business, but how does a seller deploy excess capital? Is it in a bank account somewhere? Are they investing in real estate? Do they dabble in other businesses? What is the risk profile, and how has it changed over time? What did they do 20 years ago? What do they do today? Understanding these nuances can provide a lot of valuable information to you as a buyer when you actually sit down with a seller, because now you can actually craft an offer. So understanding, does Jimmy have an immediate use of proceeds, right? Does he need cash today? Does he need a million dollars? Does he need $5 million? Is he comfortable getting cash over time? Right? So when Mark’s looking at this, Mark thinks, okay, I’ve got a few million bucks available for this acquisition.
If I’m gonna do a $10 million deal, I’m gonna have to finance this somehow. How will I do that? Can I go to a bank and leverage it? Will Jimmy take a seller note? Right? Mark can be more flexible on my price and terms if Jimmy’s gonna act as my bank. I really don’t want to put that on an LOI. Like, I don’t wanna structure this deal until I know what’s important to him, because
I know you’re sitting here thinking, well, shit, Paul, like, I don’t know, why doesn’t he just ask Jimmy? Like, why doesn’t he say, Jimmy, what do you need? How much cash do you need? And you can certainly ask these direct questions, and I’ve done it before. I think, again, in dealing with a seller who’s not done this before, it’s oftentimes better to take a very indirect approach.
And one of the things that I’ve realized over time is that when somebody like Jimmy feels like you’re really interested in their business and you’re spending time and effort, it’s really hard for Jimmy to question the assumptions you’re making. So if Mark says, hey, Jimmy, here’s a $10 million offer.
I’m gonna put $2 million of my equity capital into this. I’m gonna borrow $3 million, and you’re gonna hold a seller note. That’s a reasonable proposal. He hands that to Jimmy. He doesn’t have any background information, doesn’t know what Jimmy wants, has no idea about Jimmy’s need or use of capital. Jimmy might look at that, and Jimmy might not know that he has permission to negotiate.
He likes Mark. He doesn’t wanna lose the deal. So he stays silent on his needs, because he doesn’t want to offend, or he doesn’t understand it. He thinks like, hmm, maybe this is just how deals are structured. So he talks to Ron at the diner, and he sold a business a long time ago. Yeah, I had an earnout, I had a seller note, like that’s par for the course. Or he talks to his lawyer, and his lawyer’s like, you don’t know this guy.
You need to get all your money up front, otherwise don’t do a deal. So he gets all this kind of conflicting advice, and he might not find himself comfortable enough to have a direct conversation with Mark. So Mark, being the sophisticated buyer that he is, knows he’s gotta ascertain this information. And oftentimes he has to take an indirect approach. And so he’s gonna really understand what makes Jimmy tick before he even puts that offer in front of him.
So Mark didn’t spend a tremendous time doing research, but he did do his work. He read an article on Jimmy and the software company from years ago in an industry rag. He took a look at his Facebook page just to kind of understand, what sort of stuff did Jimmy do? What are his hobbies? Does he like to be out on a boat? Does he golf? What does he do? And then he stumbled upon a very obscure podcast that Jimmy had done in some sort of minor hospitality industry magazine.
They did some podcasts at an industry event some years ago, and it was a 15-minute discussion, and he learned, Jimmy grew up in Utica. His father worked for the railroad. His mother worked at a knit factory. He dropped out of university because he had to take a job at a hotel, because his future wife had just gotten pregnant. Now he’s working night shift at a hotel, and he’d always liked to tinker with software.
So he developed the software that ultimately became his company. So for Mark, he’s like, this is a normal guy. I’m gonna show up as a normal guy. I’m not coming in in a three-piece suit, right? I’m certainly not gonna wear my bathing suit, but I’m gonna come in in jeans and a t-shirt. And Mark knew enough to not attempt to impress Jimmy coming up from the city in a suit. He’s like, look, I’m gonna wear jeans and a t-shirt.
Now it’s time for the face-to-face meeting. Mark’s gonna take the long drive from Philly to Utica, so he’s got some hours in the car. Let’s talk about what Mark knows, what Mark might be thinking about. The facts as they stand: he wants to do a deal. He did an acquisition search, reached out to some various parties, and Jimmy is a tier one acquisition candidate, a respondent. Jimmy didn’t respond to a lot of other folks, but Mark did it right.
Jimmy has responded to it. Mark has somewhat earned Jimmy’s trust. I mean, they executed an NDA, and Jimmy even shared some financials. So now Mark has a sense of what the financials of the business look like. He understands operations a little bit better. This is a deal that he wants to do. He’s drafted an offer, and he based that offer on his research and what he could figure out and assume about Jimmy.
But today’s the day. Today’s the day he’s really gonna dig in. What he wants to do today is put himself in a position where Jimmy will accept a reasonable offer. Right now, you might say, well, he hasn’t done a lot of diligence, this might be problematic, he needs to dig in more. Well, Mark knows that he’s got a month or two months after the signing of the offer. You know, there’ll be an exclusivity. And what that means is, Jimmy won’t be able to deal with any other buyers.
But in consideration for Mark spending time, money, and effort on diligence, Jimmy’s somewhat locked in, at least through the exclusivity period. It’s not a binding deal, and it won’t be binding until they sign the purchase agreement. But Mark has a few months to investigate. He can line up financing, draft the documents, do financial accounting, legal due diligence, so on and so forth. So Mark is very comfortable at this point in time, but he’s got some issues he’s gotta deal with.
He needs to get up there and elicit an emotional response from Jimmy. He needs Jimmy to feel like Mark’s not coming off as he’s superior to him in any way. And what I mean by this is like, you know, sometimes corporate buy-side guys or private equity guys are such douche bags, right? They come in, they talk about all the deals they do and all this money, and “I went to Harvard and Stanford,” and so on and so forth, and the sellers are like, man, like, I’m way outta my league here.
These guys know a lot more than I know. That makes me uncomfortable. That makes me wanna seek out advisors that know more than I do, so that I’m not making a mistake. So if Mark comes in hot with his Wharton degree and a Stanford degree and all the deals he’s done and how sophisticated he is, he’s not actually helping himself. He’s putting himself at a significant disadvantage from a psychological perspective, because now Jimmy’s like, man, I’m outgunned and outmatched.
I need to go out and find some sophisticated advisors to make sure this guy doesn’t take advantage of me. Mark knows that. So Mark’s like, you know what? I’m coming in in a t-shirt and jeans. My focus is not on me. My focus is going to be on Jimmy. I want him to be the cleverest man in the room, and not me. I am not gonna focus on numbers. I’m not gonna interrogate him.
I am gonna go there and build a relationship with him. That’s number one. But number two, Mark knows that information is important in any bargaining, right? So understanding context behind Jimmy’s goals and motivations and objectives is gonna be very, very important. Not only crafting the offer and getting through diligence, but even executing the purchase agreement, really understanding what’s important to Jimmy, as well as post-close.
Mark also knows that he needs to conceal information. Now, Mark’s not an unethical guy. He’s not gonna lie to Jimmy. If Jimmy asks him questions, he’s going to tell him. But he’s not gonna volunteer things that may make Jimmy feel like he’s at a disadvantage. So he’s gonna focus on family and friends and hobbies and lifestyle and what it’s like to found a business.
And his attention will really be on eliciting responses from Jimmy. Let’s get Jimmy in his element, talking about what Jimmy wants to talk about, and just let it all flow. Mark’s most important objective for this meeting is, number one, he wants Jimmy to be thrilled to do business with him. He wants Jimmy to say, you know, Mark’s a standup guy.
He’s a great guy, he’s personable. I get along with him. We can do business together. I trust him. Number two, Mark wants to ferret out as much information about Jimmy’s goals, desires, and objectives as he possibly can. He wants to understand, how tight is he to this business emotionally? Is he the type of guy that’s frustrated and wants to get rid of it?
Is he the type of guy that has been thinking about it for five years but just can’t let go? Has he had any failed acquisition attempts? Right. You know, Jimmy said, hey, I don’t really talk to buyers, but had two other buyers been in there, tried to do a deal, and Jimmy just couldn’t pull the trigger? It’s really good to know if that’s the case, because now Mark can start to think about, hmm, I’ve got another acquisition that might be — eh, it’s not as good as Jimmy’s business, but from a time and resource perspective, I might be better off focused over here.
So understanding those sorts of things. And if you’re the type of person that goes in there and talks the whole time — and I think buyers sometimes think they gotta go in there and sell a seller, right? And that backfires. I think sometimes horrendously. When you want to go in there and point to all the great things that you’ve done, “I would be such a great partner,” and so on and so forth.
Well, certainly a little bit of that makes sense. But when you’re talking the whole time, like, when stuff’s coming out of your mouth, like I’m talking right now, I can’t hear, right? So you’re not gonna be listening to the seller, which is a massive, massive wasted opportunity. So what Mark thinks right now — he’s getting himself geared up — I gotta be warm, I’ve gotta be friendly, I’ve gotta ask a lot of questions, but I shouldn’t seem like I’m interrogating Jimmy.
I should talk a little bit about the business from a high-level perspective. If there’s any questions that I really need to know, I’m gonna ask him. But listen, I don’t need to get into the weeds here. That’s for diligence. I’m gonna save that. I want to get Jimmy talking. This is what I wanna do, and this is how he amps himself up in the car, thinking about questions, thinking about Jimmy’s interests, so on and so forth.
Jimmy left that meeting thinking that he dropped the ball. Like, he had all these numbers in his head, right? He was reading his P&L and EBITDA and cash flow and the growth rates, and God knows what he was thinking about, and I think he expected Mark to interrogate him a little bit about the financials. You know, what’s this charge on line 32? Why did your insurance rates go up in 2022 and down in 2021?
Mark didn’t do any of that, so it left Jimmy feeling like, hmm, maybe he’s not that interested, or maybe I didn’t do such a great job. But mission was accomplished for Mark. He made Jimmy really feel good about him. Jimmy trusted him, he liked him, and Mark got two hours’ worth of Jimmy talking about everything from his family, what he wants to do, the fact that he is starting to get burned out in the business, the fact that he would be happy to walk away, the fact that his wife has been talking about buying a vacation home on Lake Kaga for a decade, and he continues to put it off and put it off, but now it might be the time to do it. The fact that both of his children just had children of their own. So he’s a relatively recent grandfather. He’s got other obligations outside of the business.
All of this sort of stuff helps Mark understand what his immediate need for cash is and his potential willingness to take a seller note. He talked to Jimmy about his investment philosophy. Where does Jimmy tend to put his money? Is he out there buying Bitcoin and tech stocks, or is he a conservative investor?
Does he invest in real estate? How does he deploy his capital? And Mark was able to find out that Jimmy’s actually a very conservative guy. He buys some real estate there. He’s got a lot of money sitting in US treasuries, which means he’s not used to experiencing large yields, like he’s okay with perhaps a decent coupon on a seller note. So it was mission accomplished for Mark.
He definitely left Jimmy wanting a little more, but instead of dragging Jimmy out, he did a brilliant thing. He drove back to Philadelphia that day, and the very next morning he revised his offer, put it in a FedEx envelope. And he attached a very nice handwritten note to the letter of intent that basically explained to Jimmy about how comfortable he is, how excited he is about this opportunity, how this is a perfect match.
He went on and on on the letter, put it on the LOI, FedExed it to Jimmy. So now Jimmy’s not in a position to wait for this thing, right? Like, Jimmy’s not — I mean, he wondered after the lunch if Mark really was interested in the business, or if maybe Jimmy dropped the ball, but Mark didn’t make him wait for a week or two or three weeks. Mark was on it. Jimmy was thinking about doing a deal.
This whet his appetite to be able to leave the burnout, spend time with his family. This was his opportunity. He’s thinking about it, and this happens a lot, I think, when you as a potential buyer approach a seller, and the seller may not actively be thinking about selling the business. You approach, you talk about doing the deal, all of a sudden the seller’s like, man, I hadn’t really given that any thought.
I had been denying the awareness of my desire to sell this, whether consciously or unconsciously. And now I actually think about doing it. Now it’s on his mind, it’s fresh, and you have these sorts of meetings, and if you delay a response, he’s gonna think you’re a tire kicker. But he’s already thinking about selling. So now he’s either out talking to other buyers while you’re tooling around, or he’s out talking to advisors.
And in that case, you’re gonna end up paying way more for the business. So it’s important to move very quickly. You know, you’re in control. Remember, I always talk, on the sell side, the buy side, I always talk about being in control of the process. It’s hard for a buyer to be in control of a formal sell-side process, right? If I’m a bank, a sell-side banker, and I take a business out to market, it’s my process. Now, a buyer might try to preempt, a buyer might try to wrest control of the process, but if I do my job right as a banker, I’m controlling the process.
The same thing for you as a buyer. You’re not in a formal process. Like, you’ve got a proprietary deal, you’ve got a seller with no advisor, there’s no other buyer kind of waiting around. Think about how you could turn this into an orchestrated process, right? Think about how your deal-flow engine works, your valuation processes, your offers.
You can kind of put together your own little corporate development process and be ready for that. But in Mark’s case, he was ready for that. He FedExed that letter to Jimmy, and Jimmy received it the next day, and it was a Friday when Jimmy received it. Jimmy went into the weekend, and on Sunday morning he sent Mark an email, said, hey, thanks so much, it was really great meeting you. I got your offer letter. Let me digest this and I’ll get back to you. Now, Mark’s in the waiting period, and this period can be a little bit complicated, because, you know, look, if Mark were dealing with a publicly traded company that was disposing of a division, if Mark was buying a portfolio company of a private equity firm, if Mark were buying a business from a sell-side advisor, an investment banker, there would be some protocols that would typically be followed in terms of communication and offers and so on and so forth.
But when you’ve got a seller who right now you’re like, okay, he doesn’t really have a lawyer, and if he does have a lawyer, it’s certainly not an M&A attorney, he doesn’t have an M&A advisor, and now he’s looking at this offer in a vacuum, and he’s called his brother-in-law, and he’s talking to his wife, who’s been an elementary school teacher for 41 years and doesn’t have any experience in that — she’s critiquing, you know, syntax and grammar perhaps, but what does he do? How does it feel to get that offer? He looks at it and says, well, I thought my business was worth way more than 10 million bucks. Maybe he did, maybe he didn’t, I don’t know. Maybe he never expected to get more than $5 million, but Mark never asked him what he wanted for the business, and Mark took control of that process.
And I typically advise buyers, when you have any sort of information or technical advantage over the seller, when you know more about valuation than they do, it should be you putting the first offer on the table. And I’m not talking purely from an anchoring perspective, but you get your numbers out there first.
And I know, you know, it’s like on the sell side, I never put an asking price on the business, right? Like, I want buyers to make offers. I want indications of interest. I’m not putting numbers out there. I’m gonna wait to see what comes to me. That kind of gives me an idea where the market is. But on the buy side, it’s very difficult when you wait for a seller, or you ask a seller, because I gotta be honest with you, I haven’t met many people in the last 25 years who think that their business is worth less than it actually is.
It’s usually an order of magnitude, right? Like, the guy with the $5 million business is sure it’s worth 20 million bucks. And so now, you know, if Jimmy thinks his business is worth 25 million bucks and he puts a $25 million asking price on the table, now you’re negotiating. You know, now Mark’s stuck negotiating against his $25 million anchor.
So anything that Mark puts on the table is gonna be insulting. But in absence of Jimmy having said $25 million, there’s no face to be saved, right? Jimmy didn’t come out and say 25 million, and Mark’s like 10, and now it’s like, oh shit, we’re so far apart. Now Jimmy has some time to accept, right? When I talk about, you know, the principles of investment, I talk about acceptance time. Sellers need time to reorient expectations. So what would typically happen here, like if Jimmy expected $20 million for this business, he would initially panic, and he would do one of two things. A pretty typical thing is to be like, hey, Mark is a tire kicker and I’m wasting my time.
And Jimmy would just be done with the process. Like, he wouldn’t even try to counteroffer. He would just be like, that’s it, this guy’s trying to screw with me. Even though Mark’s not actually — Mark put a value, a very reasonable, fair offer on the table. Mark’s not trying to take advantage of this guy, but that could be a potential response. You know, sometimes, in a very rare occasion, the offer’s for more than what the seller expects.
And you know, you would typically expect a seller to jump on that, right? Like, it’s like, if Jimmy thought it was worth 8 million bucks and Mark put $10 million on the table, what you would expect is for Jimmy to be like, well, shit, that’s $2 million more, I better sign this paper. It’s not often what happens. What happens is, a seller will look at that and say, well, hmm, how wrong am I?
If I thought this thing was worth 8 million, this guy’s putting $10 million on the table, maybe I need to talk to somebody who knows more than me and him, because I think this thing might be worth 15 million. So as a buyer, it’s very difficult to win, particularly right out of the gate. And I think anyone that has experience dealing with sellers knows exactly what I’m talking about.
So I think the best thing that you can do if you’re in Mark’s position, you’re the buyer, is, again, you have to think about your own economic parameters. I think before going into any sort of deal, you need to say, okay, here’s what I would like to pay for this business, here’s the most I’ll pay for this business. And then you have to determine what your initial offer is going to be.
And you know, there’s tons of debates as to what you should do. Should you come in at 50%? Are you guys gonna do positional bargaining back and forth, meet in the middle, so on and so forth? I think the answer to that question, at least for me — and I think a lot of this comes from experience over time — I think you can kind of read the seller to a certain degree.
You can kind of get a sense for — I mean, there’s certain people out there who are going to bargain everything. And as buyers, you know, I’ve seen this all the time, there’s nothing worse than a seller that does not know when to stop negotiating. You know, it’s like every concession you make as a buyer is just an invitation to more bargaining, right?
And that’s a miserable position to be in as a buyer, because the seller’s never satisfied. The way I tend to, personally, this is my personal style, the way I tend to handle this is like, look, I wanna do a deal at 10 million. I would go up to 12 million with some structure in the deal, something to mitigate my risk. Maybe — but I’d go up to maybe 12, 13, right, on the high end. Where do I need to come in? And so for me, from a personal style perspective, I would tend to come in slightly lower than the 10 million bucks. I might come in at 8 million, 8.5 million, and be prepared to move up to 10 million. You always, always have to give yourself room.
People don’t feel like they’ve won unless they’ve bargained for something and gotten concessions. And so some of you, though, may look at that and say, Paul, I wanna pay 10 million bucks, I’m gonna go in at 5 million. And that would be an appropriate thing to do. It depends on how badly you actually want the transaction.
Coming in so low may do to the seller and cause him to look elsewhere. You know, in Mark’s situation, he looked at it and said, well, this is a slam dunk for me at 10 million. I could pay 12, maybe 13, but 10 million bucks, this is great. I think this is a fair price for Jimmy. I don’t want to come in too low, because number one, I don’t want Jimmy to shut down. I don’t want him to ignore me. I don’t want him to think I’m a tire kicker.
I actually wanna do the deal. I’m not out there to just buy cheap assets, and if I can’t get it, whatever, I’ll move on to the next one. No, this is strategic for me. So I wanna put a fair and respectable offer on the table that I can talk about and substantiate with a straight face. So, you know, in this case, maybe Mark went in at 8 million bucks. So Jimmy gets the $8 million offer.
We have no idea what the heck Jimmy’s thinking, right? We don’t know if he thinks it’s worth 5 million or 20 million or whatever. But Mark came in with what he thought was a fair, reasonable price. Jimmy’s got the offer. Mark’s now waiting for the response. So let’s take a 50,000-foot view here at this situation.
You know, if you’ve watched the sell-side M&A masterclass, you know that Jimmy’s making all sorts of errors. Right at this point, he’s dealing with one buyer. He’s getting effectively no market price discovery. He doesn’t have multiple buyers coming in, making offers. He, like I said, he’s dealing with one buyer. There’s no competition whatsoever.
So, you know, Mark can afford to kind of be relaxed. He’s moving the process along as quickly as possible, but there’s no other buyers necessarily waiting in the wings that he believes or suspects. So Jimmy now has somewhat of a conundrum. Jimmy’s not a finance guy. Jimmy doesn’t deal much with the valuation of things. He’s particularly conservative. So now he’s asking, not necessarily the people who are best suited to provide him answers,
Jimmy is asking the people that he trusts the most, one being his wife, the school teacher, the other being his brother-in-law. He knows a guy at church that sold a business before. It was an entirely different sort of business, but he knows a guy that sold a business, and he’s got a local attorney that he’s worked with for 27 years, and the attorney does everything from retirement plans to wills and trusts and estate and real estate.
He dabbles in a business sale here and there. So Jimmy sits down with the lawyer, and the first thing the lawyer looks at, he’s like, ah, Jimmy, there’s no deposit language in this letter of intent. Jimmy said, well, what do you mean? He said, well, you know, when you buy a home, you put a deposit down, meaning there’s gotta be earnest money. Like, how do we know this guy’s serious?
He’s not putting any earnest money. It doesn’t say, like, I’m gonna give you a check for 10%, that’s returnable if you walk away. And Jimmy’s like, well, I didn’t know we needed to do that. And the attorney’s like, absolutely we do, a hundred percent, all deals are done that way. Now, the problem is, the attorney is a hundred percent wrong. The attorney does real estate transactions.
He’s not an M&A attorney. It is very rare — maybe in the lower and middle-market business brokerage realm, but the realm in which I operate, in the middle market, larger transactions, there’s no earnest money. It’s like, look, Mark’s gonna spend a lot of time, money, and resources doing due diligence. He doesn’t need to put money down to prove that he’s serious.
So Jimmy’s already getting — I don’t wanna call it bad advice, because I mean, I think the attorney does have his best interest in mind, but not appropriate advice for the situation. And then of course, the attorney tells Jimmy, wow, that’s a great price for your business, Jimmy. Now, the attorney has no basis in value.
He’s got zero experience in financial matters whatsoever, and now he’s opining on non-legal terms, which is one of my biggest frustrations. For me, when lawyers start to get involved in business and financial terms, it frustrates me, because they have no background, experience, or expertise in financial matters. And I quite frankly wish that they would stay out of it to a certain degree.
But Jimmy’s attorney is already doing this. He’s already opining on the purchase price, which quite frankly is unfair for Jimmy, because Jimmy’s looking at the lawyer as somebody who knows more than he does. This guy does deals, and he says that’s a good price. Well, the problem that Jimmy has right now is, he’s talking to a general attorney about an M&A assignment, and this attorney does not have experience, and that’s a problem for Jimmy.
But it’s also a problem for Mark, because what often happens is, the attorney will say, hey, there should be deposit language, this guy’s trying to take advantage of you, Jimmy. So now here Mark’s trying to do the right thing. Actually, Mark’s following the book, right? This is textbook what he’s doing, and there’s an attorney in the background telling Jimmy that he’s dealing with somebody that may be trying to take advantage of him.
So I know this is a buy-side discussion and not a sell-side discussion, but I would be remiss to not bring up the point that whether you’re on the sell side or the buy side, do make sure that you have competent counsel that has experience in the subject matter that you’re dealing with. If you’re dealing with a buy-side transaction, engage an attorney that’s done a lot of buy-side work.
If you’re a seller, do the same damn thing. It’s on you to go out and get good advice. So go out and find somebody who actually knows what they’re doing. Like I said, this creates a problem now for Mark. So Jimmy, what he’s doing is talking to a variety of people, hearing a bunch of different opinions. Now he’s starting to form judgments as to who Mark is, in Mark’s absence, based on what Mark put on the paper, which is not entirely fair to Mark, but this is how life is.
And so as a buyer, you have to deal with these things. So Jimmy’s making notes. Mark didn’t even offer to give me a deposit. What does he think, I’m stupid? You know? And he’s going through this letter of intent. And the attorney, by the way, is talking about all these various different recital terms. And how attorneys tend to talk to clients, in general, in my experience — particularly some of the attorneys that do not focus on M&A transactions — is, it’s always the other side’s trying to take advantage of you, which is not helpful from an emotional and psychological perspective when trying to do a deal.
Right? When the attorney is like, hey, Scott’s trying to take advantage of you, why are you dealing with him, so on and so forth. Well, it’s easy for you to say, this attorney, and when you’re the buyer, there’s not a whole lot you can do about it. In situations that I’ve seen that are similar to this with Jimmy, it does make sense sometimes, if you’re a buyer, to suggest a couple of different sophisticated M&A attorneys to review documents on behalf of the seller, right?
It’s like, hey, Jimmy, you’ve never done this before. I’ve done this before, once or twice, and I learned some hard lessons that sometimes these attorneys don’t really understand. I know you trust your guy, I’m not gonna tell you who to deal with, but you might want to find somebody who focuses purely on M&A, because honestly, I’m not taking advantage of you. Honestly, this is what my attorney advises me to do, and this is practice protocol.
This is customary, this is the way that this works. I’m not saying your attorney is a liar, I’m just saying that he and I might have a different opinion on that. So we want to go out and maybe seek some other counsel, and at first blush, you think that’s not gonna work. But I have seen it work many, many times. I’ve seen sellers, actually, they wanna do a deal with Mark. They listen to him and they’re like, you know what, maybe I will talk to somebody else.
And then they talk to an M&A attorney, and the M&A attorney says, well, hey, listen, I’m not gonna opine on a price, that’s something that you have to figure out, but as for the deposit, yeah, I mean, I’d love to see deposits, but it’s not really customary for this particular type of transaction. In the world that I live in, I would typically get a written counterproposal or response. That’s not the world Jimmy lives in, and it’s not gonna be the world that you live in.
You go out and you deal with Jimmy. He’s gonna talk to his advisors, he’s gonna talk to his friends, he’s gonna talk to his family. He’s gonna come up with his counterproposal, and it likely will not be in writing. And it’s not gonna be a formal counterproposal. It might be a cryptic text, it might be a random email, but likely what it’s going to be is a phone call. Hello, Jimmy’s gonna call up Mark and say, Mark, I got your proposal.
I appreciate you making the offer. Your offer’s for much less than I expected it to be for. Okay, Jimmy, what did you expect it to be for? And again, I don’t know how Jimmy’s gonna respond in this particular case. Jimmy actually — true story — Jimmy actually wanted $10 million. Now, Jimmy’s business, unfortunately for Jimmy, was dramatically underpriced, had he gone out to a competitive process.
But the $10 million made Jimmy happy. But when he called Mark up, he said, you know, I really expected a lot more for my business. So Jimmy had the same problem. How does Jimmy respond to Mark? Does Jimmy just say $10 million, and then they meet somewhere in the middle at nine? Or does Jimmy overstate his demands?
Now, in this particular case, although Jimmy wanted $10 million, Jimmy knew he was negotiating. His attorney told him it was a negotiation. His wife’s like, you gotta have some backbone and really ask for more. So Jimmy asked for more. Jimmy, however, shot over the top. Jimmy responded with 15 million.
That was Jimmy’s ask. So Jimmy said, Mark, you know, I really wanted more for this business. I expect, you know, to be around 15 million bucks. And he stumbled when he said that. Mark was paying very close attention to his language, body language, the sound of his voice. And Jimmy had a difficult time getting it out, with that hesitation in the voice.
Jimmy had a hard time getting it out. Mark picked up on that. So he was, on the one hand, frustrated when he heard the 15 million. On the other hand, he felt comfortable and relaxed, because he knew Jimmy was negotiating. And these two find themselves engaged in positional bargaining. Right. You say a number, I say a number, you say a number,
I say a number, we both make concessions. There’s a variety of ways this — you know, I’m gonna tell you how this typically happens. Somebody wants $10 million for a business, somebody offers eight, somebody comes back at 12. If both parties are like Jimmy and Mark, they kind of end up around — they typically end up around the midpoint. Sometimes a guy like Jimmy will be iron-fisted and say, I want $15, not a penny less.
And then he’s kind of blown the negotiations, right? Like, okay, well, I don’t know what to do if I’m Mark. So you have to be prepared for sellers to respond in a variety of different ways. But for Mark, it was a good sign. You know, sure, he asked for more money, but he did it with hesitation. It was like, 15 million.
Okay? They ultimately ended up getting to the point and agreed on $10 million. In this particular case, when Jimmy came back at 15 million and was a little bit hesitant when he made his verbal counteroffer, Mark stopped for a second and used some judgment.
He said, okay, let me think about the leverage dynamics at play. I have strong reason to believe that Jimmy does not have another buyer. He’s never talked about another buyer. He’s never been through a process. So I literally am the only buyer at the table right now. I’ve done my homework. I know what Jimmy needs in terms of cash. I know that Jimmy is comfortable with a seller note with a reasonable return.
So Mark instantly made a counteroffer to Jimmy’s counteroffer, and he moved all the way up to his 10 million mark. He said, Jimmy, this is a deal I’m comfortable with. I’m gonna give you $5 million in cash, I’m gonna give you $5 million in the seller note. The 5 million in cash would handle the taxes, as well as the lake home that Jimmy wants to buy for his wife, as well as the other things that Jimmy wants to do.
And then the seller note over time would pay him a decent return. And then he stood pat. It was a potentially risky maneuver, but the way he looked at it was, Jimmy really didn’t want 15 million, he was bargaining. He didn’t know what Jimmy wanted to be. He also knew that there was no other competition, and he has the ability — should Jimmy introduce competition at some point, he’s got the ability to go up on his offer. He doesn’t have the ability to move an offer down. So ultimately, 10 million, 5 upfront, 5 over time, stood pat, and then gave Jimmy the requisite amount of time to get comfortable with that and ultimately accept it, which he did. Now, one of the things that I think is very important, it’s something that Mark truly understands, and it’s something that I tell junior bankers all the time: pay as much, if not more, attention to actions and behaviors than you do to words. Experienced negotiators know that actions and words need to be congruent, they need to be integrated. And when there’s a dissonance or a disparity between some of these actions and their words, that’s one that raises some questions. And I’ll give you an example. Say you’re dealing with a seller who says, yeah, you know, I’m really thinking about my business, but I’m not quite sure.
And, you know, if I get a great price, I’ll do it, but you know, I’m kind of on the fence. And that seller contacts you every other day for a status update. Well, he said he’s not that interested, but he’s hounding me. So you’ve got the words, not interested, you’ve got the actions, every 24 to 48 hours I hear from this guy. He’s either not being truthful to you, but more likely he’s not being truthful to himself.
This is oftentimes not an overt deceit. He’s actually denying awareness of his own desires, and those are being acted out, right? He’s saying, I’m not interested, but he’s doing something different. Juxtapose that to the seller who says, yeah, I’m not really that interested, maybe I would do it if I got the right offer, but I’m not really interested. And then you don’t hear from the guy, right?
He doesn’t call you. He waits to see what you’re gonna do. The language, the words, and the actions are far more congruent there, and I would give a weight to them. Inevitably, when you deal with sellers that are not out in a formal process, that do not have advisors, the problem for the sellers, and the problem for Jimmy, is he lacked that shield, per se, meaning he lacked the ability for an advisor to trial-balloon things. Had he had somebody there who was able to negotiate on his behalf, even if he wasn’t running a full process, that individual may have been able to have a conversation with Mark and say, hey, Mark, listen, your eight, or 8.5, super low, buddy. Jimmy really wants 15 million for this.
Where can you go? Right? Would you do 13? They can trial-balloon things in a way that would come off as a very weak position if Jimmy did it. And when I think about human nature in general, when I talk about actions and behaviors, you know, I think innately as humans, we know that competition increases value.
You don’t have to be a negotiation expert. I mean, just think about anything you’ve ever tried to buy, right? You wanted to buy that bicycle you saw on Craigslist, and you call up the seller and it’s a hundred bucks, and he’s like, yeah, but you know, I’ve got a couple other buyers that are in there, you better move quick. There’s no other buyers, right? Especially if the guy says, yeah, there’s a lot of other buyers, and he’s calling you four or five times.
I mean, he’s demonstrated through action. Sellers will often throw around the other buyers. I mean, I hear it all the time. I mean, every seller out there has got multiple buyers. Every seller, you know, think about it. Every seller that you go out and talk to has probably received emails and phone calls from other potential buyers. And as we know, most of that will ultimately turn into nothing.
But in their mind, they’ve got a hundred people banging down their door. You know, I’ve heard sellers say, yeah, you know, I got an offer on my business. What was it? Well, like, you know, some guy wants to talk to me. What? That’s not an offer. So it’s very easy for sellers to throw around, I’ve got other buyers, I’ve got two other buyers that wanna buy this.
You can listen to their words, but how you really understand the meat behind that is their actions. If I’ve got a bunch of other buyers, but then I’m hounding you, calling you, emailing you, wanting to know the status on you, because I’m concerned about you and I don’t want you to miss this opportunity, it’s a pretty good indication that you are likely the only buyer at the table.
But again, as humans, we know competition increases value, and it’s an easy thing, it’s cheap. Like, it doesn’t cost the seller anything to say, yeah, there’s other buyers, even if there’s a little bit of truth to that, there’s other folks that have expressed interest. Those folks that have expressed interest are, all of a sudden, you know, in their mind, legitimate buyers waiting in the wings to do this deal. So as you commence your buy-side process, you know, I would highly advise you to go back and watch the sell-side M&A masterclass, the first one that we did, because a lot of that advice for sellers, you’ll be dealing with the exact opposite of that.
And in the buy-side process, you’re gonna deal with things like — I mean, leverage is bilateral, right? I mean, buyers have leverage, sellers have leverage. In this particular case, Jimmy didn’t have a tremendous amount of leverage. Like, he didn’t really understand what his business was worth. He didn’t hire any advisors. He didn’t go out to a competitive process.
I would imagine that Mark was not the only viable buyer for that business. I mean, you know, one could argue that, you know, maybe there was a large strategic that would’ve looked and said, that technology, that sales force, those customer accounts, $2 million in cash flow, I can easily pay 10 times, if not 15 times, for that business. And now we’re talking about a 20 to $30 million deal, and Jimmy sold it for 10. So, you know, Jimmy did himself a disservice by not running a competitive process.
And Mark ultimately helped influence that decision. You know, Mark was personable, he built a rapport, every commitment he made, he lived up to, and he started to build a track record of credibility in Jimmy’s mind, which I think is important. And I think if you’re a buyer, you have to be careful to not do anything — and again, this is always subjective, you never know what’s gonna trigger this — but you want to just keep yourself, it’s a survivor, around, right? You want to keep yourself in the game, and you want to keep the seller from seeking out any other buyers. You know, if we go back to the original private equity survival guide — I did one and two, and I talked about how the private equity guys do it. Now, I don’t suspect you will take the exact same path as they will, in terms of money and resources thrown at sellers — courtside at the Bulls, dinner at Gibsons.
But you can spend time, you can wine and dine with these guys. You can certainly make them feel special, that you only have eyes for them. And likewise, they should have only eyes for you, because the more they get invested in the process with you as a buyer, the more difficult it will be for them to talk to other buyers. So those aspects of kind of courting the seller are very important for you as the buyer. In later segments of the buy-side M&A masterclass series, we’ll go into financial and accounting and legal due diligence.
We’re gonna talk about drafting the purchase agreement, which I always say is kind of that private body of law that’s negotiated between buyer and seller and will govern the transaction and the working relationship and the parties going forward. You know, but for our purposes today, we’ve kind of taken Jimmy from, you know, initial discovery all the way through acceptance of the letter of intent.
Again, we’ll be talking about their future together at some point in a later episode. But for now, I want to go back over some very key points. Number one, Mark was very sophisticated about determining why he wants to do an acquisition. The guy wasn’t trying to boil the ocean. He didn’t go out and contact 200 different companies. He specifically focused on the small handful of companies that could potentially add value to his business.
Now, I’m not saying that you shouldn’t go out and boil the ocean. You know, if you’re a search funder, you know, you’re out looking — you don’t own a business now and you’re looking to buy a company — then you actually have to do that. But you as a business owner who might wanna do some add-on acquisitions, you have to do the upfront work and determine who the right targets are, and for what reasons.
And as I said in the first installment of the series, you know, your primary goal is either decreasing risk or increasing cash flow. So it’s gotta live by one of those two masters, or both. And when you can start to locate those potential targets — you’ll never get an opportunity to make all sorts of mistakes in due diligence around the purchase agreement if you can’t get through the front door.
If not, here’s my information to have him track me down, because you want to get a meeting with these guys. And again, it’s really easy to get focused on technicals and valuation and diligence and all that sort of stuff. As your buyer — you gotta focus on that relationship. I can’t tell you — I mean, I have been in thousands, probably, over the course of my career, literally thousands of meetings between buyers and sellers.
And I can tell you that the relationship and the rapport, the emotions that you are able to elicit in sellers, your ability to make them feel good about themselves and to feel good about you, oftentimes will carry the day. That’ll oftentimes get you through the hard negotiations. And it boggles my mind how many buyers don’t focus on that.
But if you can build a relationship of trust with a seller, you’re starting off in a great position. The other thing that I always talk about — I talked extensively about it in the sell-side M&A masterclass — is credibility, right? It is really hard, if not impossible, to negotiate with anyone if you don’t have credibility. If you don’t keep your commitments, if you don’t do what you say you’re going to do, or not do what you say you’re not going to do, it is really hard for anyone to take you seriously in a negotiation. It breeds mistrust.
And I bring this up — I feel like, I mean, should I even have to? I can’t tell you how many times buyers will look at a variety of different targets and not keep their own commitments. I will send you a letter of intent on Tuesday afternoon, and then miss it by two days. Why? Why do that? Because that little rupture there will come back as a massive wave later in the negotiation process if you don’t immediately correct it.
So remaining consistent and focusing on building credibility over the course of the process will be really, really important for you, and it only takes one or two missteps to blow that credibility. We saw Mark focus on information and the asymmetrical nature of information in a bargaining scenario. Mark wasn’t deceitful. Mark didn’t hide the truth. Mark didn’t talk a lot about himself. Mark wanted to be in a position where he didn’t want to say anything that would work against his own best interests. The best way to do that is not say a lot, but he didn’t sit there silently either. He was very engaged with Jimmy, right?
So a lot of business owners — you being one of ’em — knows that this is a shit-ton of work to build and manage a business. And as business owners, we’re all suckers to a little flattering here and there. And so if you can understand what makes the seller tick and have that constructive conversation with him, not only are you going to be building rapport, but now you can get information.
And there’s a great way to do that indirectly in conversation and get as much information as you can up front. Remember, if you’re sophisticated, right, whether you are a buyer or a seller, you know that you’re never not negotiating. You know that from the very first phone call, email, letter, sit-down, what have you, negotiations have already begun.
There is the concealment and ferreting out of information. There’s the building of credibility, or the destroying of credibility. There’s the assessment of leverage factors, right? So you always need to keep in mind that you are molding perceptions from the very first second you deal with a buyer.
Everything that you do is under a microscope. There’s things that you will say and do that will ultimately offend buyers, that you know, it’ll be boggling in your mind as to why, but it’s going to happen. And why I say this is because, you know, I’ve sat at so many of these meetings where buyers will come in and talk about all their accolades and degrees and all sorts of stuff.
And like I said earlier, not only does that make the seller feel like there’s a disparity between you and them in terms of abilities, in terms of knowledge, information, perhaps resources, it’s just kind of a douchebag thing to do, right? And it sometimes can turn people off, and you do not wanna do anything — it’s like you’re trying to herd this little, like trying to get this little raccoon to eat out of your hand.
The last thing you wanna do is make any sudden movements. And so do keep that in mind. Negotiations start literally — you know, and I know this sounds like a negotiation cliché, probably it is, but I mean, they literally do start from the first second. So you need to be cognizant of that. When you talk about leverage factors within buy-side and sell-side, you know, as a buyer up against a seller, kind of one-on-one, the seller has far more ability to influence the playing field than you do, at least from a leverage perspective. So when I think about leverage — we talked about this in the sell-side M&A masterclass — I think about, like, the disparity of desire to do a deal. I mean, that’s one leverage factor.
Whether somebody needs to do a deal or really wants to do a deal, so on and so forth. You have that. And of course, another big area for leverage is competition. And competition is not really relevant for our discussion today, because you’re on the buyer side. You’re hoping to deal with the seller, and you’re hoping there’s no competition there. And if there is, you’ve gotta handle this a little bit differently.
And in future episodes we’re gonna talk about that. But disparity of desire, this is an important one. Yeah, you know, I said earlier that you should pay just as much attention to behaviors and actions as you do words, right? And sophisticated sellers are going to be doing the same thing.
And there’s a cadence to an M&A deal. And one of the best ways to inoculate yourself — you know, you don’t wanna be like Moby Dick with the big whale. Like, it’s like, look, you need to set yourself up in a position where you have options, right? So try to get yourself optionality up front. So like, Jimmy’s not the only game in town, right?
And you’ve got other companies, and they might not be as enticing, but if the price is right, they could be just as good of an investment. So optionality is important. Also, your transference of desire. I mean, I have seen everyone from private equity guys, corporate executives, to individuals out there that get so sucked into wanting to do a deal. I mean, the sellers basically got their meeting out of their hands. So you need to establish the rules of the road before you go out and start to do this. And what I mean by that is, determine what it is you’re willing to buy and not buy. Figure out those targets. Get yourself optionality. So now you’re not like, okay, there’s only one girl at the dance, right?
No, there’s multiple girls at the dance. Then think about what it is you’re willing to do and not do. And this really comes down to financial metrics. You have to think about what territory you are not willing to go to. A lot of lines in the sand for buyers tend to be drawn much too late in the process. I would encourage you to really think about what you wanna pay for the business, what you’re gonna offer upfront, and then where you won’t go a penny above, no matter what happens, like you will not be enticed. Because again, I talk about, in the sell-side M&A masterclass, the first one and the second one, incrementalism, right? So let’s do a little — let’s do a little mental gymnastics here, shall we? So in the second one, the psychology behind selling a business, I give the example of the Nomor transaction.
And it was an auction process. It was a modified auction, and we found ourself in a position — I was on the sell side, of course — where the price that we wanted was deemed astronomical. And from the starting point of where all the buyers were, none of ’em were gonna get there. Like, there’s no way we’re gonna ever get to any sort of price like that.
Okay, fine. We ultimately ended up selling it for exactly that price. And how that took place is incrementalism, right? So you’ve got a business that, you know, the seller wants a hundred million bucks for it, and you’re like, wow, I think I’ll pay 80 for it, but probably not a lot more than that. You start at 60, now you find yourself at 80, and then you’re like, ah, maybe 82, 84.
And then before you know it, there’s a very narrow gap between what they want and what you want. Maybe they’ve come down a little bit, but as that gap narrows, it becomes very difficult for you to resist, because now it’s not like you’ve moved from 60 million to 90, you just moved from $85 million to 90, and that’s not that big of an incremental change, but you’re so far off the mark from where you originally wanted to be.
So it’s important, from a cognitive perspective, to not get sucked into the whole incrementalism. Now, chances are, if you’re doing a proprietary deal and you’re dealing one-on-one with a seller, you’re gonna have positional bargaining, right? So in a formal process, what we do is we run up the price. You bid 50, and then we ask you to revise your bid, then you’re at 55, and then next thing you know you’re at 60, and then 62, and you’re like, holy shit, how did I get here?
That’s incrementalism, and that happens through big rounds. That’s a formal process, and that’s the beauty of it. It works. When you’re dealing one-on-one with a seller, it’s probably — you’re probably not gonna find yourself in a situation where you offer 10 million for something, and then the seller says 11 million, and you say, okay, I accept 11 million, the seller says 12 million, and back and forth. No, you’re gonna offer eight, and the seller’s gonna say 15, and you’re gonna try to narrow that gap. So incrementalism doesn’t hit you the same way when you’re dealing one-on-one with a seller.
But you can very easily find yourself justifying things that you would not have justified with a calm, cool, unemotional mind, an analytical mind, at the front end of the process. I see it every single day. In fact, I make my living based on this premise. So it is real, it is live, and it is well in all M&A deals. So as a buyer, draw that line in the sand up front, and actually respect yourself.
Meaning, like, you will have more respect for yourself as a deal maker if you make rules that you live by. Like, you make a lot of rules that you bend, at some point you quit respecting yourself as a deal maker, and you get bad deals. So my advice to you, again, where am I stopping, and I don’t care what happens, I’m not going a penny over this. And I say a penny over —
I mean, if it’s a penny over that, do a penny over that. But you should bring it here. During the discussion about Jimmy and Mark, we talked a little bit about the offer, right? The term sheet, or the letter of intent. I think it’s really important to expand on that, because I think a lot of buyers run into issues around this. But let’s talk about broad theory first for a second.
The letter of intent, or the term sheet, is the prelude to the definitive purchase agreement, right? It’s the framework. It’s like the menu of the purchase agreement, and the purchase agreement will be derived from the terms in the letter of intent. And if you’ve ever talked to any deal attorney, they’re gonna really work hard to make sure that whatever’s in the letter of intent jives with what’s in the purchase agreement.
So, a purchase agreement, who does it protect? Well, it protects the buyer, because the buyer’s taking the risk, the buyer’s writing the check. The purchase agreement — I mean, in a lot of ways, I wouldn’t mind being a seller and just selling a business with a bill of sale, right? Like, as-is, where-is, sign, gimme the money, and I’m done. But that’s not the way it works. Buyers are like, I’m writing a big check,
I want protection. So here you have it. And when I’m on the sell side myself, I want expansive, extensive LOIs. I want all the terms in there. I wanna know what the indemnification clauses look like. I wanna know how long representations are gonna survive for, like, is it gonna be the statute, 18 months, a year, two years, five years, 10 years? I wanna know all those sorts of things. I know that as a seller, one of my highest leverage points in a deal is immediately the second prior to signing the letter of intent.
I know that whatever I need to ask for, I need to ask for it now, because once I sign the LOI as a seller, I am locked in. Now, I’m not locked in in perpetuity, but I am in an exclusivity period. So now I’ve gotta tell all my competition, bye-bye. That’s a problem for me as a seller, because I don’t have any leverage now. Like, so I’m locked in with this buyer, and if the buyer’s silent on certain things — so now I’ve taken this thing off the market, I’ve told sellers get lost, or I’m sorry, I’ve told buyers get lost.
I’m mating now with one particular buyer. And during diligence, the buyer’s like, you know what, we need a special indemnity clause of $5 million, and we need, um, you know what, this indemnification provision’s gonna be extremely expansive, so on and so forth. Now, sometimes they find stuff in diligence, and there’s a reason for that. But if we were silent on it in the letter of intent, is the buyer really trading? Right? Is the buyer actually really doing anything wrong? Like, so for example — sometimes on European deals more so than US deals, US deals tend to be a little bit more precise in certain manners, but a lot of times in European deals, there will be reference to maybe a portion of the purchase price held in escrow. Okay, great, that’s pretty standard, but is it really an escrow, or is it a holdback?
Like, who has that money? Is it in a bank escrow account, or is it — is the company holding that money back? Where’s it going? And is it contingent upon anything? And so if we’re not clear in the letter of intent, there’s a lot of confusion. And when you deal with sophisticated corporate buyers, private equity firms, so on and so forth, there’s less danger of that, because
I guess maybe they’re more suited to figure it out. But when you deal with a seller who’s never sold a business before, you know, I could argue, on the one hand, man, it’s great to have a one-page term sheet, like, let’s just put the purchase price and then figure it all out, and then we can kind of push that seller around. And as a matter of fact, that was my general operating principle for some time.
But as I got older, lost a lot of hair, gained a little bit of weight, but certainly got a lot more experience, one of the things that I have noticed is, that’s probably not the right way to do it. And here’s why. Because the sellers aren’t the sophisticated corporate buyers. And if the letter of intent is silent on something, something that’s a necessity, something that will be in the purchase agreement, it is your fault, Mr.
Buyer. It is your fault that you didn’t mention it in the LOI. They’re not gonna say, oh, you know what, dammit, I should have asked for that, I’m the seller, it’s my responsibility to make sure the LOI is robust. That’s not what they’re gonna say. What they’re gonna say is, you tried to screw me, you’re deceptive, you’re underhanded. And their lawyer’s gonna echo that. Yeah, this guy’s bad news, what are you doing? And now you find yourself, you’re like, well, well shit, I, you know, sure,
I wanted to give myself a little room. I’m not trying to take advantage of this guy. Now he thinks I’m trying to screw him. That’s not what I’m trying to do. But perceptions are reality, unfortunately, in the game of bargaining, and that’s exactly what you’re doing. So those of you who are more experienced, take more poetic license with the LOI, for sure. But for you newbies out there, if this is your first acquisition or second acquisition and you’re still kind of getting your wings, I think it’s really important to kind of go long on the LOI and get those terms there.
Talk about, like, what indemnification provisions look like. Talk about survival, reps and warranties. Go into perhaps what the reps will look like. What does the seller actually rep into? The more expansive you are, and you can get them to agree to it upfront, the less problems you’ll have. And granted, while it shouldn’t be the seller — right, the seller has the leverage prior to signing the LOI, the seller should be demanding that stuff —
I don’t know, I think sometimes it might put you in a better position, because I think that’s really frustrating for buyers, especially newer buyers, is to do a lot of work and spend a lot of money, and then, you know, have a $12 million deal fall apart because there’s disagreement about $500 in monthly rent for the facility that you don’t even want to lease.
And the seller thinks you’re trying to screw him, and he’s only gonna deal with people who don’t lie, and he can’t live with you, and he can’t trust you. I’ve seen it. I know I’m gonna get a lot of questions about due diligence, and I know I’m gonna get a lot of questions about, how on earth is it that Mark got a P&L and made an offer?
How was he even sure if he wanted to buy the business? So there’s a variety of different ways to look at this. There’s some buyers that’ll go out there and literally put an offer on anything. They get some basic financial statements, they put an offer out there, see if it sticks, and if it does, now we’re gonna invest some time and actually try to investigate.
There’s other buyers who are maddening, and this shouldn’t be you. You shouldn’t request reams of data prior to even making an offer, ’cause you’re just frustrating the seller, right? They gotta do a lot of work, they’re trying to run a business. You’re gonna naturally have a lot of these people self-select out of your process. You don’t need to get into their tax returns prior to doing a deal, so on and so forth.
You know, it’s like, you need to assess for you and your business what are the most important things that you need. So the primary question is, why are you doing the deal? Like, so the primary reason that you’re doing the deal should actually lead to, you do the types of things that you need to look at, right? So if you really care about the customer accounts, you’re like, man, I need these customers, I can cross-sell these customers. Well, you know, a little bit of upfront customer DD, of course, is gonna serve you well.
What’s customer concentration? What do they look like? Size, so on and so forth. If this is just a cash-flow buy for you, then you might be far more concerned primarily on the financial statements, right? If you have management that’s gonna run that business, then that’s great, you don’t really care as much to dig into management structure. Management structures and incentives upfront — if you need that management team, well, boy, you better make sure they’re sticking around, right?
Like, so those would be questions to ask upfront. Like, if there’s somebody — you got a woman running a business, the owner is selling it and leaving, and you need that woman, and she’s valuable to your process. Well, listen, does she have a non-competition agreement or a non-solicitation agreement with the current entity? What sort of incentive structures does she have?
Does she have a stay bonus? What is her relationship with ownership and the board, so on and so forth? Like, the things that are important to you upfront warrant discussion. Because it makes scant sense to negotiate things, get into a letter of intent, hire lawyers, do all sorts of stuff, and then figure everything out in diligence. No, zero in — 80/20 principle here all day. On upfront, zero in on the most important things.
The rest of them can be figured out in due diligence. I think one of the issues that’s always comical here in the US is, you know, US corporations will file tax returns, and, you know, there’s always debates as to — so for me, like, a real M&A process, you’re not providing tax returns to any buyer outside of actual due diligence, right?
Like, one buyer’s gonna see that, and that’s gonna be the buyer that’s in diligence. Or unless you have multiple buyers in due diligence at the same time. But preliminarily to that, that’s not gonna happen. So as a buyer, I mean, what’s the advice for you? Focus on your key points that need pre-offer DD, right? Just those. Focus on the materials that you need.
Do not use a canned request list. It’s annoying, right? It is madly annoying to be like, uh, here’s 49 different documents I need to see before I make an offer. No, 80/20 principle. Yeah, pick the most important ones. If you have a particular concern about the business, and you’re like, man, it’s got liability claim issues, or whatever, like, then focus on that.
Focus on the things that are important, because you don’t want a seller to self-select out of your process prior to actually engaging you in any sort of constructive discussions or negotiations. You’d spend all this time looking for a target, and then to have somebody get frustrated because you’re asking for too much information — and they will, and everyone’s frustrated with too much information.
Like, you’re gonna ask for five things, and the seller’s gonna wish it was three. You’re gonna ask for three things, and you’re gonna wish it was one. So I realize what you’re dealing with, but do yourself a favor, make it easier for them. It’s gonna make it easier for you. Another point we talked about was Mark’s valuation of Jimmy’s business, and we did some basic broad math, and I want to talk a little bit about valuation.
For your purposes, you might be a business that’s looking to do add-on acquisitions. You might be an individual. We have lived in an era of ever-increasing asset prices, right? So if you think about the great financial crisis that took place in 2008, 2009, global economy cratered, and then, between central governments and central banks around the world, debt instruments were created, monetary assets were created, we had just an explosion of asset price inflation, where, you know, we saw companies that would traditionally, you know, trade on exchanges in the US for like six or seven times EBITDA now start trading at 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 times.
I mean, valuations went crazy. Private equity is now prolific. Like, even 10 years ago, they were not nearly as active. So private equity is now in everything. And when more buyers get in, prices get bid up. It is extremely difficult to be a buyer. However, you shouldn’t be discouraged, because there are a lot of sellers out there that understand far less about this than you do.
And buyers will come to me. So here at Potomac, we only do sell-side advisory, but what’s interesting is, we actually do more buy-side work than we do sell-side, which is kind of strange. So, what do you mean? Well, so we have clients that engage us on sell. And they’ll say something like, hey, I’m gonna sell five years from now, two years from now, two weeks from now, what have you. But they’re all at different phases of their life cycle.
But they wanna engage us, and we put together a preliminary valuation on their business, and we start to talk about how they create value. And then inevitably somebody will call me up and say, hey, Paul, yeah, I was talking to some guy at a trade show, and he introduced me to another guy, and there’s a business in my industry, and it does, you know, like $8 million a year in revenue, and I think I wanna buy it. Like, you know, I think it’s a good fit.
Can you guys help us? And so we will do as much buy-side work as we possibly can. We don’t charge our — they’re our clients, and we want them to be huge, so when we sell ’em, we make more money. But we’ll do buy-side work for them. And so we’ll get financial statements, and our analyst team will build a financial model. We’ll look at comparable acquisition statistics, so on and so forth.
We’ll get our clients the intelligence that they need. They wanna do due diligence on something? Well, we’re not PwC or EY, but we do have a transaction services team. So our transaction services team can do the same thing a big accounting firm can do, is they’ll go in and they’ll look at — they’ll do cash proof analyses, and they’ll verify books and records, and so on and so forth. So again, we don’t charge for that. And by the way, I tell every one of our clients, like, that’s a service.
Like, we’ll get to it when we can, and sometimes we don’t have the capacity to do it. We don’t charge for it, but we do it to build value. And I think it’s a very unique and valuable thing that we do, and every one of our clients loves it. So we do hundreds of buy-side deals per year. And so while I am not a buy-side guy, I am qualified to speak on it, ’cause I deal with a lot of sellers, and I also deal with a lot of buyers. So when it comes to valuation, when our clients come to us and they say, hey, I wanna buy this — I don’t know, make up the industry — this tool-and-die shop doing $3 million a year in revenue, it’s got this CNC thing and all that, that’s widget gizmo — and we’ll get the financial statements, we’ll put together a financial model, and we’ll do a discounted cash flow analysis, and maybe internal rates of return, and we’ll kind of look at this and determine what sort of purchase price multiple would make sense from a value creation perspective.
And we’re gonna be a little bit more sophisticated than you will be, but that’s okay, and I’m gonna tell you why. Like, so for our clients, we might say, hey, Fred, your business is currently valued at 12 to 13 times trailing EBITDA. That’s what it would get in the current market in a competitive process. If you can buy this business at six times, here’s how much value you can create, and here’s how you should structure it.
Yeah, but given the fact that we’ve lived in a world of ever-increasing asset prices, like I said earlier, like, sellers typically never want less than what their business actually would touch out in the open market, at least in a competitive process. And so I don’t really care so much about comps. Like, if you’re out there buying — you name the business, a bottle of water company, a software business, an IT staffing company — the more you learn about what private equity is paying and other strategic acquirers are paying, the worse it is for you, because they’re paying more money than you are.
They’ve got more of a capacity to pay. The cost of capital might be lower. They’re getting better arbitrage than you are. And so, why anchor yourself to that? I mean, I’m probably the only investment banker on the planet that’s telling you, don’t worry about comps, worry about what actually makes sense for you. Like, what sort of return parameters do you have?
And sure, you could do internal rate of return, and you could do a discounted cash flow, but, like, when you’re just getting started at this, I think bro math, like back of the napkin, it’s like, okay, this business is kicking off $2 million per year in cash flow. And I know it’s cash flow, not just EBITDA, like bullshit adjusted EBITDA, because I’m looking at the financial statements, and you know, I understand what working capital requirements are, and I understand what capital expenditures are, so I know what’s happening below the line.
I’m gonna adjust that and make sure I really understand what true cash flow is. Then, yeah, I’m gonna pay four or 5, 6, 7 times. Because again, as I always say, like, you know, you buy the best company in the world, if you overpay for it, it’s a bad investment. You can buy a mediocre business, but if you get it at a dynamite price, it could be a phenomenal investment. And so if you’re a value investor, I would really focus on EBITDA or some metric of cash flow, and look at it from a multiple perspective, and try to be somewhere in the mid-single digits.
I think if you can do that — now again, that might be high, actually, for some businesses out there, but I’m saying, on the average, if you can do that, you’re living in a world where you could probably create a lot of value. You start looking at comps — this company went for 12x, this one went for 13 times, that one went for 10 times — and you’re like, man, I wanna pay 5x for it, I’m super low. Now you’re discouraged, now you’re not gonna make an offer, and now you might not even have an opportunity.
So get out there and make an offer that you actually can reasonably support. I can support a five times EBITDA or a six times EBITDA, and I know sophisticated buyers out there are laughing at me right now, because they’re like, Paul, that’s not even possible. It is possible. I see it all the time. I mean, every single day of the week, I see companies out there creating a ton of value, paying lower prices.
What does that mean? It means you have to avoid competitive processes, right? You can’t go to an investment bank, right? You can’t call up Goldman Sachs or Harris Williams or Potomac or any of us and get a deal. That’s not the way it works. You have to go out there and do the hard work and get the proprietary deals. You have to find the sellers who are potentially ignorant of what’s going on in the market, or maybe they’re not ignorant, but maybe they’ve fallen so much in love with you and your company and your culture and the business that you’ve built, that they’re willing to actually leave money on the table to do a deal with you.
Never underestimate that. Never underestimate businesses making the decision. I see it all the time. It boggles — I scratch my head, I’m like, why would you leave that sort of money on the table to do a deal with them? But you like the company, you like the owner, you like the president. So don’t create constraints in your own mind.
Don’t create limiting beliefs as to what you could ultimately do, especially if you’re new to buy-side M&A and you’re new to going out and doing deals. Like, you gotta get yourself centered and grounded and say, you know what? I’m gonna focus on doing a deal. I’m gonna focus on doing a deal that is right for me from a financial perspective, irrespective of where the market is. And if you shake up bushes and you kiss enough frogs and you get out there, you will find opportunity, and you’re gonna be doing deals at such low risk that it’ll actually be very hard for you to lose. So we covered a lot today, with the example of Jimmy and Mark. I hope that provided you a little context and background in the dynamics of the one-on-one negotiation between buyer and seller. And in upcoming installments of the buy-side M&A masterclass series, I’m gonna get into due diligence. So, what happens once Jimmy signs that letter of intent? Now it’s time to do diligence. There’s finance, accounting, cash proof analysis, so on and so forth. When we talk about that, then we’ll also at some point talk about the drafting and negotiation of the definitive purchase agreement. So, is it a stock deal? Is it an asset deal? And then, what are all the provisions in this private body of law that’s negotiated between buyer and seller?
And of course, because this is the buy side, I’m gonna be focusing on this from a buy-side perspective, and I’ll also be doing this in the sell-side M&A masterclass series, from the sell-side perspective. Here at Potomac, we love to kill it for our clients, and I think that education is the cornerstone which allows our clients to make the best decisions for themselves. The more you can understand about the nuances of how strategic acquirers work, how the operations of private equity firms work, and the psychology and the tactics of an M&A transaction, the better you are going to be when it comes time to pull the trigger.
If you own a business and you’re being contacted by strategic acquirers, search funds, private equity firms, and you’re trying to size up what you might do, take a step back and give us a call. We’ll help you forge a plan, whether that exit is a year from now, five years from now, or 10 years from now. We’ll help you think through a plan that is specifically tailored to your financial goals and objectives.
So please contact us directly. I’ve put a link to the contact form in the description of this video, and you can also contact me directly on LinkedIn, and feel free to share this masterclass series with somebody who you think might benefit from it. Again, I’m Paul Giannamore. Thank you for joining me today, and I’ll see you on the next one.
Buy-Side M&A Masterclass Part 2: How to Source, Value, and Make an Offer on a Business
In this installment of the Buy-Side M&A Masterclass series, investment banker and negotiation expert Paul Giannamore walks through the complete front-end acquisition process — from sourcing a target and building rapport with the seller, to valuing the business and crafting a letter of intent. Using a detailed case study of a buyer named Mark pursuing a hospitality software company owned by a founder named Jimmy, Paul reveals the psychology, strategy, and real-world tactics that separate sophisticated acquirers from the rest.
Why Relationship-Building Beats Financial Modeling in Buy-Side M&A
Most buyers over-invest in technical skills — valuation models, financial accounting, due diligence checklists — and under-invest in the one thing that often determines whether a deal gets done: the relationship with the seller. Paul argues that a buyer who can’t build rapport with a seller will either lose the deal entirely or overpay for it. Mark’s two-hour lunch with Jimmy, which appeared to cover almost nothing of substance, was in fact a masterclass in eliciting information, building trust, and positioning himself as the only buyer worth considering. He arrived in jeans, focused entirely on Jimmy’s story, and left without interrogating a single line item on the P&L.
How to Source Acquisition Targets the Right Way
Rather than blasting emails to hundreds of companies, Mark identified a short list of five to six software businesses in his vertical, tiered them by strategic fit, and sent each owner a highly personalized, research-driven letter via FedEx. He referenced the company’s specific hotel accounts, industry awards, and history — making it impossible for Jimmy to dismiss it as a form letter. Paul emphasizes that proprietary outreach like this is the only reliable path to deals at reasonable valuations. Competitive auction processes, by design, drive prices to the ceiling.
Valuing a Business Without Getting Distracted by Comparable Transactions
Paul makes a contrarian case against anchoring to market comps. In an era where private equity is bidding up businesses to 12–15x EBITDA, comparing yourself to those buyers is discouraging at best and financially reckless at worst. Instead, Mark focused exclusively on what the business was worth to him on a standalone basis — using simple “bro math” to determine that $10 million (5x EBITDA on $2 million in annual cash flow) was a slam dunk, and that he could stretch to $12–13 million with the right deal structure. The goal is to identify your floor, your ceiling, and your opening offer before you ever sit down with the seller.
Understanding Seller Psychology Before You Make an Offer
Before drafting his LOI, Mark invested two hours understanding what Jimmy actually wanted from a sale — not just financially, but emotionally. He learned that Jimmy was burned out, that his wife had been asking for a lake home for a decade, that he was a new grandfather, and that he was a conservative investor comfortable with US Treasuries. All of this shaped how Mark structured his offer: $5 million in cash (enough to cover taxes and the lake house) and $5 million in a seller note at a rate Jimmy would find acceptable. Paul’s core point: you cannot craft a compelling offer without first understanding the seller’s goals, fears, and financial situation.
How to Structure and Present a Letter of Intent
Paul breaks down the difference between an indication of interest (a brief, range-based expression of interest) and a letter of intent or term sheet (a more detailed document outlining the actual deal terms). For first-time sellers like Jimmy, Mark deliberately wrote his LOI in plain English — minimal legalese, clear rationale, and a straightforward purchase price. Paul strongly advises buyers, especially newer ones, to go long on the LOI: spell out indemnification provisions, rep and warranty survival periods, and deal structure up front. Leaving terms silent doesn’t give you flexibility — it makes unsophisticated sellers feel deceived when those terms surface later in the purchase agreement.
Positional Bargaining and How to Handle the Counteroffer
When Mark offered $8 million and Jimmy countered at $15 million with noticeable hesitation, Mark recognized a classic positional bargaining dynamic. Rather than grinding through incremental concessions, he moved directly to his target price of $10 million — split evenly between cash and a seller note — and held firm. He had correctly assessed that Jimmy had no other buyers, no M&A advisor, and a genuine desire to sell. Paul emphasizes two rules: always give yourself room to move, and always set your walk-away price before negotiations begin. Incrementalism is the silent deal killer that causes buyers to rationalize prices they never would have accepted with a clear head.
Watching Actions, Not Just Words
One of Paul’s most practical lessons in the episode: pay as much attention to how sellers behave as to what they say. A seller who claims to be “not that interested” but contacts you every 48 hours for a status update is telling you exactly how interested they actually are. Conversely, a seller who says the same thing and then goes quiet is far more credible. The same logic applies to claims of competing buyers — nearly every seller implies they have other offers, but their behavior almost always tells the true story.
The Danger of Unqualified Advisors on Either Side of the Deal
Jimmy made a common mistake: he turned to his general practice attorney — a man who handles wills, real estate, and retirement plans — for M&A guidance. That attorney introduced unnecessary friction by insisting on earnest money deposits (standard in real estate, not in middle-market M&A) and raising concerns that made Jimmy question Mark’s motives. Paul’s advice to buyers: if your seller is working with a generalist attorney who is mischaracterizing standard deal terms, gently suggest they seek a second opinion from an M&A-focused lawyer. It protects the deal and protects the relationship.
Key Takeaways for Buy-Side M&A
This episode distills years of deal-making experience into a practical framework for business owners and corporate development professionals pursuing proprietary acquisitions. The most important lessons: define your acquisition thesis clearly before you start, differentiate your outreach so sellers take you seriously, value the business on your own terms rather than chasing market comps, invest heavily in the seller relationship before and after you make an offer, and write an LOI that is specific enough to prevent misunderstandings from derailing a deal that both parties want to close.
Future installments of the Buy-Side M&A Masterclass series will cover financial and accounting due diligence, drafting and negotiating the definitive purchase agreement, and deal structuring considerations including asset versus stock transactions.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is buy-side M&A?
Buy-side M&A refers to the process of acquiring another business. It involves identifying and sourcing acquisition targets, building a relationship with the seller, valuing the business, structuring an offer, and negotiating through to a signed purchase agreement. Unlike sell-side M&A — where an advisor represents the business being sold — the buy side focuses on the acquirer’s strategy, diligence, and deal execution.
How do you find acquisition targets without using an investment bank?
The most effective way to find proprietary acquisition targets is through direct, personalized outreach. Rather than sending generic emails, sophisticated buyers research their target list in advance — understanding the company’s history, key people, customers, and accolades — and reach out via a handwritten letter or FedEx package. This approach stands out in a sea of broker emails and significantly increases the likelihood of getting a response from an owner who is not actively looking to sell.
How should a buyer value a small or mid-sized business?
For most buyers pursuing proprietary deals, the most practical approach is to value the business based on what it is worth to you on a standalone basis — not on what comparable transactions suggest. Start with true cash flow (EBITDA adjusted for working capital and capital expenditure requirements), then determine a multiple that reflects an acceptable return given your risk. Paying mid-single-digit multiples of EBITDA is the goal for value-creating acquisitions. Anchoring to market comps — where private equity often pays 12–15x EBITDA — sets unrealistic expectations and can cause buyers to overpay.
What is a letter of intent (LOI) in M&A?
A letter of intent (LOI), also called a term sheet, is a non-binding document that outlines the proposed terms of an acquisition before a definitive purchase agreement is drafted. It typically covers the purchase price, deal structure, exclusivity period, and key conditions. Under US common law, an LOI is generally non-binding when stated as such, but it serves as the framework for the purchase agreement that follows. Buyers should draft LOIs that are specific and detailed — especially when dealing with first-time sellers — to avoid disputes later in the process.
What is the difference between an indication of interest and a letter of intent?
An indication of interest (IOI) is a brief, often one-page document that expresses a buyer’s interest in acquiring a business, typically with a valuation range rather than a specific price. It is commonly used in formal, competitive sell-side processes where multiple buyers submit early-stage bids. A letter of intent (LOI) is more detailed, includes a specific proposed purchase price and deal structure, and is used when a buyer has a direct line to the seller and is ready to move toward exclusivity and due diligence.
Should a buyer make the first offer or wait for the seller to name a price?
When the buyer has more experience with valuation than the seller — which is common in direct, one-on-one deals — the buyer should make the first offer. Waiting for the seller to name a price risks anchoring negotiations at an inflated number that is difficult to negotiate down. By making the first offer, the buyer sets the anchor and avoids the psychological disadvantage of responding to a seller’s potentially unrealistic price expectation.
What is a seller note and why does it matter in a deal structure?
A seller note is a form of financing in which the seller agrees to receive a portion of the purchase price over time, effectively acting as a lender to the buyer. This allows the buyer to close the deal with less upfront capital while giving the seller a return on the deferred amount. Seller notes are most effective when the buyer understands the seller’s financial situation and risk tolerance. A seller who is conservative with money and comfortable with steady returns — such as one who holds US Treasuries — is a strong candidate to accept a seller note as part of the deal structure.
What is positional bargaining in M&A negotiations?
Positional bargaining is a negotiation style in which each party states a position — typically a price — and both sides make concessions until they reach an agreement. In direct business acquisitions, this often looks like a buyer offering a low price, the seller countering high, and the two parties working toward a middle ground. Experienced buyers set their target price and maximum price before negotiations begin, giving themselves room to make concessions without exceeding the point at which the deal no longer makes financial sense.
What is incrementalism in M&A and why is it dangerous for buyers?
Incrementalism in M&A is the psychological phenomenon in which a buyer gradually raises their offer in small steps until they have paid far more than they originally intended. Each individual concession feels minor, but the cumulative effect can push the purchase price well beyond what makes financial sense. Buyers can protect against incrementalism by setting a firm walk-away price before negotiations begin and committing to it regardless of how close the gap becomes near the end of a negotiation.
How important is the seller relationship in a direct acquisition?
The seller relationship is often more important than any technical skill in a direct, one-on-one acquisition. A buyer who builds genuine trust and rapport with a seller can keep that seller from seeking out competing buyers, make difficult negotiations easier to navigate, and even motivate a seller to accept a lower price in exchange for doing a deal with someone they like and trust. Sellers — especially founders — are deeply emotionally attached to their businesses, and a buyer who respects and understands that attachment has a significant advantage over one who leads with credentials and financial analysis.
Do you need earnest money or a deposit when making an offer to buy a business?
In most middle-market business acquisitions in the United States, earnest money deposits are not customary at the letter of intent stage. Unlike real estate transactions, where deposits are standard, M&A deals typically rely on the buyer’s commitment of time, money, and resources during the due diligence period as evidence of serious intent. Requiring or expecting a deposit at the LOI stage is a common mistake made by general practice attorneys who are unfamiliar with M&A transaction norms.
Why is it important to have an M&A attorney instead of a general practice lawyer?
M&A transactions involve highly specialized legal and financial terms that general practice attorneys are often not equipped to evaluate. A lawyer who primarily handles real estate, wills, or small business matters may mischaracterize standard M&A practices — such as the absence of earnest money deposits or the structure of indemnification provisions — and inadvertently create mistrust between buyer and seller. Both buyers and sellers benefit from working with attorneys who have direct experience closing business acquisitions of similar size and complexity.